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E A R M A R K E D S A F E T Y M O N E Y E F F E C T IV E IN G E O R G IA
There is much discussion, particularly in federal circles, whether it
is proper to earmark money for safety projects or to provide lump
sums with broad discretional capabilities for administrators to meet
needs differently within a given state. The question remains, will this
latter method best respond to the highway safety problems of America
or is earmarking money for safety a myth? Webster tells us the defini
tion of a myth involves the creation of a story that reveals an un
scientific account, belief, or theory. I wonder today, as we look at
the record, if we can ascertain whether earmarking money for safety
purposes has been a myth or, in actuality, has been a boon to America’s
improvement in highway safety.
Let’s look at the facts. It is generally conceded that our country
marked its peak in traffic fatalities in 1973 when 56,000 people were
killed on the nation’s highways. In our own state of Georgia, this was
the peak year as 1,926 deaths (an all-time high) were recorded. I
wonder if it is a coincidence that 1973 was also the year the Highway
Safety Act stipulated that funds should be spent in several specific
areas which we came to know as Title II. And I wonder if it is also
a coincidence that the 1966 Safety Act which stipulated performance
standards for 18 different areas, for the most part finally came under
sanctions in 1973 when the states were advised that they would produce
or be sanctioned. Other programs, such as T O P IC S , also had earmarked
money involved in a mad scramble for implementation in 1973 to
avoid the lapse of funds. A ll of these actions resulted in a significant
change in the highway environments arrival of 1974.
Coincidentally, in 1974 there was a national downtrend in acci
dent experience. Many people are quick to point out that this down
trend occurred due to the energy crisis and mandatory reduction to
a 55 mph speed limit. Also, other factors included a reduction in
travel as vehicle miles were recorded down in most every state, a
trend to smaller vehicles was beginning, the oil crisis, improved safety
equipment for autos, and the nation’s economy in general was tightened.
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A ll of these were reasons logically advanced for the decline in traffic
fatalities.
W hile the verdict is not finally in, it can certainly be appreciated
that many states including Georgia did register significant decreases in
their fatality experience during 1975. Speaking of our situation in
Georgia, we recorded a reduction of about 20 percent fatalities in
1974 over 1973. (See Figure 1.) The numbers were reduced from
1,912 in 1973 to 1,557 in 1974. This reduction trend even continued
into 1975 when our current total of 1,383 fatalities indicated an
additional 11 percent reduction over that experienced in 1974. Thus,
one can see through all these statistics that if Georgia’s all-time high
of 1,912 fatalities had continued through 1974 and 1975, over 900
additional lives would have been lost. In actuality, 529 fewer people
were killed during this period than the respective year before. This
is a total reduction slightly less than 30 percent.

Figure 1.

Did earmarking the money for highway safety improvements play
a role in this reduction, or is this a myth? Consider that the 1975
reduction, at least in Georgia, continued at a significant rate. Yet
most of the generally acknowledged traffic factors had been accounted
for during 1974. Most knowledgeable experts think the effects of
the 55 mph speed limit leveled off by mid-1974 and later, speeds were
actually measured on a slight increase toward the end of 1974. Cer
tainly traffic volumes have recovered. Georgia’s experience indicates
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that 1975 volumes exceeded our previous all-time 1973 high. What
then could have had an effect in 1975? Could it possibly be that the
earmarking of money for safety projects, which was initiated in 1973,
had picked up a head of steam and was now beginning to pay direct
dividends to those who were advantaged in following the program
specifically? I think the answer is yes, and I would like to demonstrate
to you from the experiences in Georgia some of the reasons that
make me draw these conclusions. I will reveal to you briefly some
project locations where improvements were made that are typical of
reducing and eliminating accident hazard and frequency.
IN T E R S T A T E S A F E T Y
Many modifications are needed for improved interstate safety,
including attenuation devices, grooving of pavement, breakaway poles,
improvement of median barrier systems, adding street illumination for
nighttime problems, improved treatment for lane drop and for lane
carry conditions, such as when two facilities merge into one. Our
accident statistics have enjoyed a substantial reduction in recent years
on the interstate system, a goodly portion which can be attributed
to projects of this type. During 1971, our final interstate fatal accident
rate was 3.16 per 100 M V M and this figure had been reduced to
1.39 fatalities per 100 M V M of travel in 1974, and we expect it
to be even better in 1975. Our volumes were up, but we lost only
85 persons in an interstate traffic fatality compared to 106 in 1974.
I would like to highlight for you just three representative projects:•
• A ramp metering project in downtown Atlanta on the con
nector carrying both I-75 and I-85.
• A bridge barrier rail project on I-20 just outside of Atlanta.
• A safety modification project on I-85 in north Georgia.
In Atlanta on the I-75 downtown connector, southbond at North
Avenue, a ramp metering project was installed at a location which
sets up a short weaving type conflict.

(See Figure 2.)

W hile ac

complished only at a cost of $2,200, it produced a first-year benefit
of $153,000 since the accidents were reduced over 50 percent, from
203 to 101 annually. Further north on this highway, a similar type
problem was treated by channeling an on-ramp from Peachtree Road
directly into I-75, thus eliminating another potential weaving con
flict.

(See Figure 3.)

persuasive.

The accident reduction here is even more
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Figure 2.

Figure 3.

Sometimes, accident locations are at a spot. Consider a bridge
on I-20 outside Atlanta. Seven fatalities were recorded on this bridge
in a period of six years. Each of the fatal accidents had the same
characteristic of the vehicle losing control and veering into the side
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of the bridge. Efforts to correct the problem included the use of
raised pavement markers, striping, and, significantly, the construction
of the New Jersey barrier wall for a handrail in conjunction with
some widening of the bridge. Skid marks on the barrier are indicative
of at least one fatality being averted since this recent construction.
Interstate safety modifications have been frequently utilized as
safety projects in Georgia. This one covering 54 miles on I-85 in
north Georgia, through five counties, saw a reduction of average
annual fatalities from 16 to three after completion of the project.
Mainly, motorists have been running into fixed objects, going between
twin bridges, and are not properly redirected through guardrail at
tachments.
T O P IC S A N D S A F E T Y
Our T O P IC S and safety work have addressed the largest number
of individual locations where problems of hazard or congestion exist.
During fiscal year 1975, over 600 locations were treated with im
provements by signalization, intersection channelization, reversible
lanes, turn lanes, street lighting, signal systems, pavement markings
including plastic and raised pavement markers, skid resistance, and
improved signing and signal displays. This is the program directed
to urban areas where problems in Georgia are at a maximum. While
the state has enjoyed a substantial decrease in fatalities in the last
several years, this reduction has not been so apparent in the urban
areas. Before 1975, the T O P IC S programs were directed mostly to
those urban areas over 50,000. Since its initiation, three of those seven
areas have already begun to show a definite decline in their accident
and fatality pictures. These are Columbus, Atlanta, and Albany,
Georgia. However, traffic accident hazards in the remaining four
metropolitan areas and the hundreds of smaller urban sections of
the state have continued to amass alarming numbers in the traffic
accident picture. This is indicative that more of this type of work,
on a cost-effective basis, will be the key to reversing this trend through
out the state. For example, let’s examine some of these projects.
Figure 4 shows a project in Atlanta on Memorial Drive (S.R.
154). A reversible lane was created with the provision of overhead
signal modernization and minor widening. The project was accom
plished for $97,000, and due to the reduction in travel times, ac
cumulated a first-year benefit of approximately $140,000. Further,
an accident reduction of 25 percent was experienced when the one
year before and after count was reduced from 220 to 165.
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Figure 4.

In Chatham County, nine locations were grouped in a project, cost
ing $264,000. This widening, resurfacing, channelization, and signal
modernization produced a first-year benefit, nearly paying for the cost
of the project at $205,000. The accidents were reduced over 50
percent with a one-year before and after reduction from 273 to 136.
In Columbus, we have apparently been able to record a significant
improvement in accident experience due to coordination of traffic
signals on Macon Road. This signal system was accomplished for
$115,000 and has registered reductions in accident experience, es
pecially at critical midblock locations. The average overall accident
reduction of 15 percent was not as impressive as the record of high
accident experience at crucial midblocks. For example, at Midtown
Drive, an unsignalized intersection, monthly accidents dropped from
11 to 3 (73 percent). This has greatly improved efficiency of use for
this 25,000 vehicle-per-day traffic corridor, vital to the city commerce.
M A IN T E N A N C E B E T T E R M E N T S
This work has included adjustments for signing, channelization,
pavement markings, flood control, passing lanes, turn lanes, shoulder
improvements, and emergency signal work including special traffic con
trol of overspeed, underspeed, and overheight detection systems. For
the most part, these are our rural projects comparable to the efforts
accomplished in T O P IC S and safety work noted above. Since most

119
of the principal traffic arteries in this rural environment are on the
state system, many of the most serious problems have been given
attention, and that is reflected in substantial reductions in hazard for
those areas. Georgia’s peak fatality experience was recorded in 1973
when 1,912 people were killed in auto accidents. This compares with
1,508 recorded in 1971 and 1,557 recorded in 1974. O f significance,
however: in 1971, 1,255 of the 1,509 occurred in rural areas, whereas
in 1974, only 1,064 of the 1,557 occurred in rural areas. Consider
some examples of this work.
Here are three representative projects. The first is in Baldwin
County involving the channelization of an intersection at S.R. 24
and S.R. 22. In the year before this work was accomplished, ten
accidents, eight injuries, and no fatalities were recorded. In the one
year since the work, not a single accident has been recorded. The
project cost only $1,000. In W alker County, 33 accidents, 14 injuries,
and three fatalities had occurred in a ten-mile sector due largely to
the loss of control from bad shoulders. The shoulders were paved
at a cost of $22,000, and in the one year following the completion
of the work, nine accidents, five injuries, and two fatalities were the
result.
Our passing lane program is typified by a project in Stephens
County on S.R. 12. (See Figure 5.) Here a climbing lane was
constructed for a mile and a half in length at a cost of $41,000. The

Figure 5.
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accident experience registered a decrease from 14 in the year before
the lane to two after the lane. However, of equal importance was that
six injuries and one fatality before the advent of the climbing lane
was reduced to no fatalities and no injuries afterwards.
O T H E R S A F E T Y IM P R O V E M E N T S
This work includes improvements that have been accomplished on
our interstate travelways, as well as the programs addressed under
the Title II portion of the Highway Safety Act. That is, programs
that address railroad crossings for active or passive improvements,
pavement marking demonstrations, roadside obstacles, high hazard
improvements, and safer roads demonstrations. Most of this work
in dollar volume is accounted for under the Title II programs. Repre
sentative of the type wx>rk accomplished are projects like our recent
treatment of the U.S. 41 interstate travelway connecting the uncom
pleted links of I-75 north of Atlanta. This project registered a de
crease from 34 fatalities in 1972 with 1,271 accident occurrences to
a 1975 year-to-date experience of five fatalities and 449 accident
occurrences. The type improvements registered included median guard
rail, turn lanes, pavement markers, special treatment of additional
superelevation on a particular hazardous curve, the addition of traffic
signals at key locations, and the use of special effects signing for this
corridor. (See Figure 6.) The U.S. 41 interstate travelway connecting

Figure 6.
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the uncompleted sections of I-75 was 31 miles long in 1972. You
can see that its wide median and exceptional condition could lull some
travelers into thinking they were still on the interstate. In fact it
did. Tragically, 34 fatalities were recorded on those 31 miles. In
an attempt to get public attention and change this operating en
vironment, the actions described above caused major reductions in
the user characteristics of this road. In 1975, under the same traffic
volumes, five fatalities were recorded.
The railroad crossing problem in Georgia is of significant im
portance. In 1974, an all-time high of 66 fatalities were recorded in
highway/railroad grade crossings. It was not coincidence that only 17
crossings were identified as safety hazards and provided bells, lights,
and gates for active protection during that year. In fiscal 1975, how
ever, the picture began to change drastically, and, since then, 214 active
crossings already have been protected in a manner similar to that shown
here. (See Figure 7.) The results are indicative of this type of work
activity. W e recorded 24 fatalities in car/train collisions as compared
to 171 that were recorded 1972-1974. Those crossings that cannot
be provided immediate attention with lights, bells, and gates are
provided other controls. For example, this crossing near Milledgeville,
Georgia, was provided street illumination since the only train activity
was at night and since several fatalities had been recorded. Ironically,
but also tragically, before these lights could be erected, two individuals

Figure 7.
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on two successive Saturday nights ran into the side of the same sched
uled train, with fatal injuries resulting in both cases. Most of the
other critical crossings (1,500 during 1975) have been treated with
passive controls such as signs and pavement markings.
D R IV E W A Y C O N T R O L S
The effective control of driveways has proven a significant benefit
in Georgia. (See Figure 8.) W hile there is much work yet to be
done, there are indications that accident experience can be reduced
more than one-half in those areas that have defined points of ingress
and egress through driveway control. For instance, an example in
Clayton County with curb control compared to Upson County without
curb control, under the same 8,000 vehicles per day, produced annual
accident experience of nine in the first case and 20 in the second.
Sampling the work that has been accomplished in the state and com
puting the rate of accidents per 100 M V M , we find that the acci
dents tend to be below the average throughout the state for sections
that have controlled drives and more than twice the state average
for those sections not having driveway controls. (See Figures 9 and
10.) Thus, to not use driveway controls as an effective tool for
improvement is to negate an important asset available for the regu
lation of partial access control.
STATEWIDE S A M P L E
COMPARISON OF ACCIDENT R A T E S
C O N T R O L L E D -U N C O N T R O L L E D DRIVEW AYS
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Figure 9.

Figure 10.

C O N C L U S IO N S
I cannot categorically state that earmarking money for safety is
the only means whereby traffic safety improvements will come about.
I can state that there does appear to be a direct relation between
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the timing when some safety funds were earmarked and the change
in tide to register improvements in highway safety. Certainly, ear
marking federal funds will lend a tremendous boost to highway safety.
The ability for a direct payoff in the improvement of highway safety
can be seen through unbiased eyes that examine past results. I would
humbly submit the proper prescription to anecdote our current traffic
ills is for more of the same— traffic engineering programs directed to
the heart of the cancer. Earmarking funds to representative areas of
the traffic safety problem can do no harm and can potentially accelerate
the ability of this country to correct one of its largest social ills— the
traffic safety hazard.
As we look ahead to a changing economy, political pressure, and
public demand, certainly we can see insurance to our highway safety
effort will be increased by earmarking funds in a manner experienced
with T O P IC S , Title II, and Highway Safety Program areas. This
approach will shield us from the human factors environment that push
in the direction of least resistance. Each day now, we see increasing
demands for reduced administrative cost (P E and design costs are
nearly as high for a T O P IC S project as a multimillion dollar road),
less new funds available for the future facility (building that longrange commitment for a four-lane road), and other complications on
the social, ecological, political, and economical battlefield. A ll of these
are valid pressures which cause it to be in our best interest as traffic
safety engineers to dispel negative thoughts regarding the earmarked
money myth.

